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Introduction 
Aims:
 Prove the necessity for the implementation of Security Assessment in 
offshore oil and gas assets.
Provide an overview of Security Assessment methodologies  focusing in the 
most applicable to offshore oil and gas assets. 
 Indicate the inter-disciplinary approach required for the Security Assessment 
of offshore oil and gas assets.
Present an example of usage of a Security Assessment tool.
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Security and Threats
 Security Assessment: “…an evaluation of an asset’s characteristics to determine 
security threats, vulnerabilities and protective/mitigation measures.”
 Threat: “… an indication, circumstance, or event with the potential to cause loss of or 
damage to an asset.” 
 Adversaries can be Insider, External or colluded.
 Threat categories:
> Terrorists (international or domestic)
> Activists
> Disgruntled employees or contractors
> Criminals (cyber criminals, pirates)
> Inter-state adversaries
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Source: M.Kashubsky, 
www.start.umd.edu, 
Information elaborated by authors.
Types of Security Incidents (1899 - 2018)
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Source: M.Kashubsky, 
www.start.umd.edu,.Inform
ation elaborated by authors.
Effects of Security Incidents
• Injury or death of personnel
• Damage or loss of assets
• Pollution to the environment
• Disruption of oil and gas production operations
• Disruption of oil and gas supply to the market
• Loss of income for companies
• Increase of oil prices
• Effect on global economies and stock exchange
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Security Challenges
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Offshore installations are isolated assets.
Seizure of an offshore platform offers tactical advantages to the intruders due to 
the  difficulties that the security forces would have in mounting an assault.
IEDs can be planted in various locations maximizing a domino effect if exploded.
Offshore platforms are complex industrial facilities with the presence of chemical 
processing equipment and facilities as well as hazardous materials.  
Limited ways of evacuation of platforms via helicopter or ship transfer, depended 
on  weather conditions.
Attacks on Offshore platforms can cause petroleum and hazardous materials 
leaks that can lead to environmental catastrophe.
Offshore installations involve both maritime and chemical processing operations.
Effects of attacks on Offshore platforms are difficult to contain and can lead to 
partial or complete destruction of the facilities. 
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Security Assessment
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Security Assessment Approaches
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Maritime 
Security
Industrial 
Security
CIP
Critical 
Infrastructure 
Protection
- SRA/SVA API STD 780 , API RP 70, API RP 70I
- VAM-CF
- FVIKOR
- PRAF
- Prototype VAM  DOE, DOJ, SANDIA
- RAMCAP  US DHS/ASME ITI LLC
- MBVA /MBRA  NPS 
- CIMS
- DECRIS
- CARVER
- CRISRRAM  EC - JRC
- CIPDSS
- CIPMA
- BIRR
- RVA
- NSRAM
- NEMO
- N-ABLE
- MDM
- MIN
- FAIT
- EURACOM
- COUNTERACT
- SSA/PFSA  ISPS
- MSRAM (Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model)  USCG
SSA - PFSA (ISPS Ship- and Port Facility- Security Assessment)
Aim: “… to enhance maritime security at sea and at port focusing 
in the protection against terrorists, pirates & stowaways.”
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Security Guidance 
and Policies
Set Security Levels
Establish Roles 
(CSO, SSO, PFSO)
Security  Assessment
SSA
PFSA
Security Plan
SSP
PFSP
Vessel Security
Facility Security
Government and Industry Policies
SSA - PFSA (ISPS Ship- and Port Facility- Security Assessment)
11
 Existing security measures, 
procedures, operations.
 Critical asset operations
 Threats for critical asset operations
 Incident likelihood
 New security measures
 Vulnerabilities
 Physical Security
 Structural  Integrity
 Personnel Protection Systems
 Procedural Policies
 Communication Systems
 Asset infrastructure
 Utilities
Security 
Assessment
SSA
PFSA
“…a subjective risk analysis of all aspects of the operation in a port or 
ship to determine vulnerabilities and likelihood of a terrorist attack...”
MSRAM (Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model)
“MSRAM was designed to identify and prioritize critical
infrastructure, key resources and high consequence scenario’s
across sectors using a common risk methodology, taxonomy and
metrics to measure security risk from terrorism at the local,
regional and national levels.”
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API SRA/SVA
The API has developed standards applicable to the security assessment of 
offshore oil and gas assets and operations implementing the Security Risk and 
Vulnerability Assessment (SRA/SVA) methods.
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API SRA (API STD 780)
“Security risks should be managed in a risk-based, performance-oriented management 
process  to ensure the security of assets and the protection of the public, the environment, 
workers, and the continuity of the business.”
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Analyze assets and criticality. 
Screen Assets on consequence.
Identify Critical Assets.
Analyze threats and asset attractiveness. 
Determine target assets.
Conduct scenario analysis. 
Determine act-specific consequences and vulnerability.
Assess risk against security criteria. 
Evaluate security upgrades as required.
Determine residual risk. 
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API SVA (API RP 70 and API RP 70I)
“… a secondary evaluation that examines a facility’s characteristics and operations to 
identify potential threats or vulnerabilities and existing and prospective security measures 
and procedures designed to protect a facility.”
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STEP 1: Potential Threat
STEP 2: Consequence Assessment
STEP 3: Vulnerability Assessment 
STEP 4: Mitigation 
STEP 5: Implementation
 Company policy that defines security goals and 
commitments including and control of SSI.
 Communication protocol with authorities for emergency 
preparedness, assessment and reporting of security 
issues.
 Security Plan, Company Security Officer (CSO) and 
Facility Security Officer (FSO).
 Integration of HSAS and MARSEC Security Levels rankings 
into offshore and company operations. 
Developed to support US-DHS in the 
definition of a common framework for the 
assessment of  vulnerability  from terrorist acts.
Designed to provide comparable results 
across infrastructure assets and sectors in order 
to prioritize risk across the critical 
infrastructure.
Aimed at the identification of an efficient 
and consistent mechanism of reporting 
essential risk information to US-DHS, to be 
applied to both private and governmental 
sectors.
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RAMCAP (Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection) 
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MBVA (Model-Based Vulnerability Assessment)
Simple  Identify asset network and hubs. Reduce asset complexity and identify criticality.
Standardized Quantify threats by indentifying the faults and likelihoods.
Quantified Achieve thorough analysis of asset components and fault/failure combinations. 
Rational Develop mitigation strategy. Justify budget expenditure (CAPEX/OPEX).
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CRISRRAM (CRitical Infrastructures & Systems Risk and Resilience Assessment Methodology) 
 It adopts a system of 
systems approach and 
aims to address issues at 
asset level, system level 
and society level.
 It follows an all-
hazards approach.
 Developed 
considering gaps of 
existing Risk Assessment 
methods in the industry.
 Developed to be 
applicable nationally 
and internationally for 
EU states.
Security Levels
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 Implementation of Security Assessment measures to contain incidents and 
maintain desired security levels.
 Security level enables for preemptive planning and proactive implementation of 
preventive security measures.
HSAS
(Homeland 
Security Advisory 
System)
MARSEC 
USCG
(Maritime 
Security)
ISPS API STD 780 API RP 70 API RP70I
LOW: Green
LEVEL 1 LEVEL 1: Maintained 
at all times
LEVEL 1: Very Low LOW: Green
LEVEL 1: Minimal risk 
of threatGUARDED: Blue LEVEL 2: Low GUARDED: Blue
LEVEL 3: Medium ELEVATED: YellowELEVATED: Yellow
HIGH: Orange LEVEL 2
LEVEL 2: Maintained 
for a period of time as a 
result of heightened risk
LEVEL 4: High HIGH: Orange LEVEL 2:  Heightened 
risk of security incident
SEVERE: Red LEVEL 3
LEVEL 3: Maintained 
for a limited period of 
time
LEVEL 5: Very High SEVERE: Red LEVEL 3:  imminent 
security incident
Source: API with information elaborated by authors.
Security Assessment and PSM (Process Safety Management)
Quantitative and Qualitative process safety review can define risks, 
hazards and consequences of security incidents in offshore oil and gas 
systems, equipments, processes and operations.
Threats
Consequence: 
Security  
Incident
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Source: ABS with information elaborated by authors.
Assessment Tools: Bow-Tie Analysis
Utilize bow-tie analysis for the identification of security barriers and 
measures for assets in the micro- and macro- scales .
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PREVENTION MITIGATION
Source: ABS with information elaborated by authors.
Why Bow-Tie Analysis?
“By linking ‘Hazards’ & ‘Consequences’ to an ‘Event’ it is possible to 
develop the relationship to include the causes, or ‘Threats’, and the 
‘Prevention’ & ‘Recovery Measures’”  (ABS)
 Simple & pragmatic approach
 Emphasis on effectiveness of risk reduction measures
 Effective visualization
 Allows better communication of hazards
 Can be applied for all types of hazards
 Increasingly becoming the preferred techniques by regulatory bodies & 
leading companies
 Efficiently aided by user-friendly software 
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Bow-Tie Example
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Bow-Tie Example
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Research - Next Steps
Current status: 
 Selection of security risk analysis method.
 Compilation of state of the art for security analysis methods in the offshore 
oil and gas sector. 
Next steps:  
 Check implementation issues of selected risk analysis method.
 Validation of experimental methodology based on selected risk analysis 
method.
Aims:  
 Study the link between Maritime Security, Physical Protection, Anti-Terrorism  
and Force Protection measures and Process Hazard and Risk Analysis. 
 Study the interaction of components and assets in security breach scenarios 
and subsequent domino effect propagation.
 Develop methodologies and tools for assessing and managing the process 
hazards and vulnerability risks due to security incidents in the offshore oil  
and gas assets.
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Thank you for your attention
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